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Central Intelligence Bulletin

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South Vietnam - Cambodia: Few major enemy units have been engaged by allied forces during the first week of the US - South Vietnamese cross-border operations.

Although the allies have been able to harass the Communists' command and control apparatus and have forced many Communist main force units to relocate, the enemy's forces have stood and fought in only a few instances. Most of these battles took place in regions where the terrain offered advantages to the enemy.


Despite the lack of major engagements, well over 3,500 Communists have reportedly been killed by the allies' heavy firepower, including air and artillery strikes. The US has lost 48 dead, while 176 South Vietnamese soldiers have been killed. [redacted]

[redacted] the higher echelons of COSVN have been relocated farther from the South Vietnamese border. [redacted]

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Laos: The government is getting jittery about the Communist military threat in the southern half of the country.

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The government announced on 8 May that it would proceed with the immediate evacuation of the provincial capital of Saravane.

In the Attopeu area, a government guerrilla base on the Bolovens Plateau was hit by rocket fire on 8 May. This second attack in as many days resulted in damage to the base airstrip, a supply building, and an ammunition storage site. The Communists continue to hold Attopeu town and the key fire base overlooking the immediate area.

Military spokesmen in Vientiane are also claiming that there is a major threat to the royal capital of Luang Prabang and have gone so far as to state that its evacuation is under active consideration. It is not clear whether such exaggerated stories reflect genuine concern or are only an indirect expression of the dissatisfaction of some military leaders at the attention that has been given to the Meo fight for Long Tieng.

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At Long Tieng, the absence of a serious Communist assault on the Meo stronghold apparently has raised the morale of its defenders, and conditions there reportedly are showing continued improvement. Civilians have begun to filter back into the Long Tieng Valley, the base hospital has reopened, and several small markets are back in business. Government troops are reported to be closing in on Khang Kho, a guerrilla base seized by the enemy last month.

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[Redacted] Guided Missile Destroyer (DDG) - Kanin Class




Soviet Naval Units Enter Caribbean Sea

UNITED STATES



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USSR-Caribbean: The Soviet naval units in the Caribbean area could be headed for Cuba and possibly other ports.

Two submarines and a tender entered the Caribbean early yesterday. The remaining ships--a Kresta-class guided missile cruiser, a Kanin-class guided missile destroyer, and a support ship--were north of the Mona passage at last sighting.

Although there is no information as to their destination, units of a similar Soviet fleet called at Cuba, Martinique, and Barbados last year. In addition, an attempt was made to arrange a call at a Mexican port, but the Soviet proposal was rejected.

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USSR: Additional, and perhaps more important, personnel changes in the Soviet Government are likely after the national election on 14 June.

Stories predicting such a turnover in the state bureaucracy have been circulating in Moscow for some time. Some changes in the management of the economy and the communications media have been made since the beginning of the year. Other shifts are likely this summer, when the newly elected Supreme Soviet will go through the motions of "approving" a new cabinet. In the US Embassy's view, the removal of Minister of Culture Furtseva seems virtually assured.

Some of these shifts will probably be related to a jockeying for position within the leadership. There are already signs that the pace of such maneuvering is picking up as the time approaches for the 24th Party Congress, which--though still unscheduled--is expected to meet late this fall. The regime's dissatisfaction with shoddy administrative work and last year's bad economic performance will also be important factors in any changes that may occur.

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Venezuela: Student protests against US involvement in Cambodia have resulted in violence, but police have so far succeeded in retaining control.

Since 5 May, students have twice demonstrated at the US Embassy, as well as in other parts of Caracas and in several provincial cities. A scuffle between police and students at Central University on 7 May resulted in the death of at least one student, and the university has been closed until Monday to forestall further outbreaks there.

The protests seem to be directed by the influential non-Communist Federation of University Centers (FCU), and efforts by Communist groups to take over the demonstrations have apparently been ineffectual. The FCU has announced that the protests will continue until next Wednesday, when a "national mobilization" is scheduled to take place.

If the demonstrations increase in size and intensity, it is likely that the armed forces will be called in to occupy the grounds of Caracas' Central University. The military last occupied the university in October following four days of violent protest over government abuse of student militants.

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NOTES

Libya: The presence of Egyptian troops has worsened the security situation in Cyrenaica. [redacted]

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[redacted] three Egyptian advisers were found dead in Benghazi during the last week of April. The police, angry at being reprimanded for not protecting Egyptians, went on strike, and civil servants staged a slow-down. Several persons were hospitalized following fights between Libyan Army personnel and Egyptians. Prime Minister Qaddafi went to Benghazi to try to settle the dispute. Some Libyans are reported to be hoping the trouble will offer Cyrenaican Military Governor Kharubi the opportunity to replace Qaddafi, but chances for such a turnover seem slim. [redacted]

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Ceylon: The leftist opposition coalition is trying to discredit Prime Minister Dudley Senanayake's United National Party (UNP), which apparently is maintaining a slight lead as the elections scheduled for 27 May approach. Leaders of the coalition claim they have information that the armed forces are preparing to seize power if the UNP loses. They further charge that recent reports from government sources alleging that ultraleft revolutionary groups are making preparations for a campaign of violence are merely a pretext to justify a coup. Ceylonese politicians frequently use coup rumors to further their aims, and there is no evidence that the government is preparing for a military takeover. [redacted]

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